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O'Connor: Intoxicating Liquors - Liquor License Transfer - Liens on Liquor

CASE NOTE
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Liquor License Transfer-Liens on Liquor Licenses.
Johnson v. Smith, 455 P.2d 244 (Wyo. 1969).

Plaintiff and his wife were owners of the capital stock
of the Gladstone Hotel, Inc. in Casper, Wyoming. As original
mortgagors on chattel and real estate mortgages on the hotel
in which Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company was
the mortgagee, plaintiff and his wife transferred their interest
in the hotel to the Center Street Investment Company in 1961,
which in turn, executed a second real estate mortgage in favor
of the plaintiffs and agreed to assume the original indebtedness. Center Street conveyed its interest in the Gladstone Hotel Inc. to the defendant. A liquor license had been annually issued to the corporation since 1956. When the original mortgagee, Massachusetts Mutual, commenced foreclosure on its
interest, plaintiffs initiated similar proceedings against the
defendant. Prior to the first foreclosure sale, plaintiffs paid
the first mortgagee the total indebtedness and brought suit
for summary judgment and a decree of foreclosure on the second real estate mortgage, contending that the liquor license
was included in the real and chattel mortgages. The District
Court found in favor of the plaintiffs holding that under the
terms of the real and chattel mortgages the liquor license was
included as an article appurtenant to the hotel property. Upon
appeal the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the Natrona
County District Court, holding that real and chattel mortgages, intending to include all of a liquor establishment's
property, necessarily imply the inclusion of the liquor license.'
In essence, a liquor license in Wyoming was construed to be a
valuable piece of property upon which a mortgage might attach.
Because of the sparsity of decisions regarding liquor license liens, the law is far from settled. Most controversies
regarding the issue are decided on the collateral area of transfer, in which statutes are usually relevant. These vary from
the restrictive approach on which such licenses are inalienable,2 to the more permissive statutes which allow quite liberal
1. Johnson v. Smith, 455 P.2d 244 (Wyo. 1969).
Copyright@ 1970 by the University of Wyoming

2. An example of such a statute is NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-149 (1968). "A license
shall be purely a personal privilege... and shall not constitute property,.. •
nor shall it be alienable or transferable... or subject to being encumbered or
hypothecated."
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transferability.' In interpreting the former, courts have frequently held that a liquor permit is a personal privilege which
cannot be assigned to another.' Being a personal privilege,
such a liquor permit is outside the grasp of the licensee's
creditors who might wish to attach it or levy execution upon
it. 5 Such a declaration which construes a liquor permit as a
personal privilege and not subject to transfer, usually has as
its motive the belief that licenses of this nature should be free
from any outside influence which might subject the license to
exterior pressure.' The latter type of enactment, the statute
allowing more liberal transferability, denotes the current
trend in this area. Under these statutes licenses are generally
considered to have property characteristics which may under
some circumstances pass to an assignee or trustee of the licensee.7 Nevertheless the permits still remain under the control and scrutiny of the state or local licensing authorities,
the transfer only being valid in the case of a person or persons
who are not denied the right to take as original license holders.8 There is no common law property right in a liquor license since the scope of limitations is primarily determined
by the legislature, and the rights of the licensee are such, and
only such, as the legislature statutorily permits.' Consequently when a statute permits a license to be transferred or
sold, even under restricted conditions, the personal privilege
interpretation is subordinated to the property concept and the
license takes on certain characteristics of property, intangible
though it may be.10 Most jurisdictions have come to realize
that a liquor license is an economic asset, because of its obvious
pecuniary value, especially in states or localities in which the
quantity of permits is limited by statute or ordinance. To
deny that a license has any property characteristics when
such a license is transferable would be contradictory, even
when the state in the exercise of its police power may regulate
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

9.
10.

See CAL. Bus & P. CODE, § 24070. "Each license is separate and distinct
and is transferable upon approval of the department from the licensee to
another person and from one premises to another premises."
Annot., 131 A.L.R. 1340 (1941).
Paramount Finance Co. v. S & C Tavern, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Ohio
1965).
Walsh v. Bradley, 121 N.J.Eq. 359, 190 A. 88 (1937).
4A, COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, § 70, at 306 (14th ed. 1967).
48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 138 (1947).
State v. Superior Court of Marion County, 233 Ind. 596, 122 N.E.2d 9 (1954).
Deggender v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 41 Wash. 385, 83 P. 898 (1906).
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the manner of transfer and assignment." Such statutes would
give greater emphasis to the intent of the parties involved in
a transfer in that the transferee of a liquor establishment, who
also simultaneously becomes the transferee of the adjoining
liquor license, if he so qualifies under the statute, receives
that which is more commensurate with what he has bargained
for, as opposed to a transferee who purchases the physical
premises only to find that even though he is eligible for a
liquor permit, he cannot possibly receive one.
A considerable number of legislatures have enacted statutes which allow liquor license transfer subject to extensive
limitations, which include required approval from the licensing authorities. Wyoming has such a provision." This compromise between the two extremes at initial observation seems
to create superficial confusion. However, upon analysis of
the section, the clash may be partially, if not totally, resolved.
As between the rights of the licensee and the state liquor authorities, the liquor permit is but a personal privilege subject
to the police power of the State and is not a property right in
the statutory sense; but as beween the licensee and third persons, such as an assignee or trustee, the license is a property
right with definite economic value.1 Such a provision incorporates the advantages of both viewpoints. The state regulatory agency may retain sufficient control over the liquor license while at the same time permit the furtherance of the intent of the licensee and subsequent qualified third parties involved in a later transfer.
Interpretation of Wyoming's liquor license transfer statute" has indicated influence from both schools of construction. In Scranton v. Whitlock," the state Supreme Court
held that a license to sell liquor was a mere personal privilege.
Bogus v. American National Bank of Cheyenne, a Tenth Cir11. Pacific Firestone Escrow Co. v. Food Giant Markets, Inc., 202 Cal. App.2d
155 20 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1962).
12. WYo. STAT. § 12-13 (1957): "A license shall be a personal privilege, good
for one year unless sooner revoked, provided... that the owner of such license
S. .may... assign and transfer such license... subject to the conditions and
approval herein stated ....
Except as above provided, no license shall be
transferred or sold. . .nor shall it be subject to attachment, garnishment or
execution."
13. WYO. STAT. § 12-13 (1957).
14. Hooper v. Duncan, 95 Ariz. 305, 389 P.2d 706 (1964).
15. Scranton v. Whitlock, 389 P.2d 1015 (Wyo. 1964); also see Whitesides v.
Council of City of Cheyenne, 78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520 (1957).
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cuit case based upon similar facts to the Johnson case, but concerned with the language of the Uniform Commercial Code,
said:
Although by the terms of the liquor control statute
a license is a personal privilege which is not subject
to attachment, garnishment or execution, it nevertheless has, under the liquor control law, an element
of transferability, as under certain conditions it may
be sold. As this case shows, it has a unique value.
These characteristics stamp a liquor license as an
item of property, even though it is statutorily said to
be a personal privilege as well. 6
Armed with the liberal interpretation of this decision, the
Supreme Court justified its holding in the Johnson case by
relying heavily upon the Bogus opinion. In Johnson the
Court looked at the original chattel mortgage which provided
that the Smiths
transfer. . .all of the property, goods, and chattels
listed on Schedule A hereto annexed and entitled
"List of fixtures, furnishings, and equipment".

..

to-

gether with any and all renewals or replacements of
or additions to any such property, goods, and chattels..."
From this was inferred that the license to sell liquor,
defined as an article of property under the Bogus decision,
was impliedly included within the framework of the chattel
mortgage. In the chattel and real estate mortgages the parties
involved had seemingly created an all inclusive document upon
which they intended that the entirety of the mortgagor's property should be subject to a lien upon the occurence of default
in payment. As a result the license was also treated as a valuable economic unit under consideration as security when the
comprehensive mortgages were created. The Johnson case is
not the first in which the Wyoming court has held that property of economic value may be impliedly included in comprehensive real and chattel mortgages. Tobacco, liquor and other
alcoholic beverages have been treated along with other bar fixtures as included within a mortgage lien.18 The theory be16. 401 F.2d 458, 460-61 (10th Cir. 1968).
17. Johnson v. Smith, supra note 1, at 249.
18. Hill v. Salmon, 69 Wyo. 1, 236 P.2d 518 (1951).
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hind such rationalization is based upon the concept that, if
the parties so intended, the unity of the establishment should
be maintained under the transfer, if reasonably possible.19
The District Court had expressed the desirability of maintaining such unity when it stated that "the preservation of the
liquor license in the premises was necessary to prevent invasion and destruction of the security interest holder's rights
in the security. .... ""

Turning to the statute," the Court once again liberally
construed the enactment when it said that although attachment, garnishment, and execution are not permitted, "there
is no direct prohibition against its being subject to a lien."
A definite legal distinction is evident between a lien and
an attachment, garnishment, or execution. The former is
somewhat analogous to a mortgage, especially in lien states
such as Wyoming."8 A mortgage lien implies a voluntary
transfer of an interest in the form of a contract between the
parties involved whereby a lien is created or real estate is
pledged for the payment of a debt. An attachment, garnishment, or execution, on the other hand, imply an involuntary
transfer of the property. For instance, an attachment is a
proceeding to take property into legal custody to satisfy a
creditor's demand. 4 Although not exactly synonymous, garnishment and execution likewise imply a form of transfer of
an involuntary nature. In recognizing this distinction, the
Court was able to construe the liquor license as an extension
of the property concept already previously established. 5
The Court disregarded appelant's contention that at the
time of the creation of the mortgages, the parties thereto had
not intended to include the liquor license within the subject
matter of the document. Viewing the factual situation as a
whole, one is inclined to believe that the majority decision's
premise is not sustained by the circumstances available. Because of statutory regulations restricting the quantities of
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Scranton v. Whitlock, supra note 15.
Johnson v. Smith, supra note 1, at 247.
WYo. STAT. § 12-13 (1957).
Johnson v. Smith, supra note 1, at 250.
Robinson Mercantile Co. v. Davis, 26 Wyo. 484, 187 P. 931 (1920).
Kohler v. Cole, 79 N.D. 226, 55 N.W.2d 589 (1952).
Bogus v. American National Bank of Cheyenne, supra note 15.
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such permits available in an area,26 commercial demand produces a highly inflated economic market value on liquor licenses. One is lead to the conclusion that had the parties intended to include the liquor permit in the mortgages, surely
they would have done so. The exclusion of the most valuable
asset in the premises seems to be prima facia evidence of the
absence of intent to include the permit. Because of its intangibility, and because of the absence of inclusion or exclusion
of licenses in prior mortgages, the parties probably formed no
intent at all regarding the attachment of a lien on the liquor
permit. For the Court to include the liquor license is to subordinate the original intent of the parties to a secondary
position in favor of achieving the desired judicial result.
Under the statutes the holder of a liquor license may
transfer the license to different premises upon approval of the
licensing authorities. 7 Prior to foreclosure proceedings, the
holder may have reasonably believed that he could transfer or
assign the liquor permit without restriction from the mortgagees, especially when the law is so unsettled regarding
whether an assignee would have taken the liquor license subject to a lien. The inclusion of the liquor permit within the
mortgages seemingly took place in an ex post facto manner at
the time of the judicial proceedings, not at the time of the
creation of the mortgage document.
Although the Court might have disregarded the original
intent of the parties in the Johnson case, nevertheless when
viewed in a long range perspective, this is not as equitable as
it may seem. As a result of this opinion mortgagors of liquor
establishments in Wyoming will be permitted to mortgage
both the tangible real and personal property relating to the
premises as well as the intangible "property" of the liquor license. This will enable them to acquire a greater capital supply because of the value of the mortgaged asset, if they qualify
under the statute to become licensees themselves. Mortgagees
are now faced with the situation that if they wish to retain
the liquor establishment for their own use, they must not only
successfully bid at the foreclosure sale in order to acquire
both the premises and the license but must also receive ap26. WYo. STAT. § 12-6 (1957).
27. WYO. STAT. § 12-13 (1957).
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proval from the licensing authorities. The same is true if
purchase is made by a third party. Failure to bid successfully may possibly frustrate the mortgagee's intent to take
possession himself if he so desired, although he would still
obviously benefit from the sale as a mortgagee. This dilemma
is one properly to be resolved by the parties, not by judicial
declaration.
An issue of definite judicial concern has arisen as a consequence of the Johnson case. The question now arises as to
whether holders of liquor licenses may now mortgage the
license independent of the physical premises. The Court
failed to consider this question, so the resolution of this
issue awaits possible future litigation. To hold in the affirmative would be to extend the Bogus case one step further and to
fully develop the property concept of liquor licenses. The
writer could find no decisions which have held that liquor licenses may be independently mortgaged; therefore any examination of the effects of such a decision are merely speculative.
However, it seems that no serious detrimental effects would
be forthcoming; conversely an even greater freedom of negotiation could be given to individuals involved in mortgages
on liquor establishments.
In regard to the litigants themselves in the Johnson case,
the immediate results reached by the Wyoming Supreme
Court are questionable. Perhaps the Court should have
chosen a subsequent case involving a different factual situation to reach the result that it did. Nevertheless, the Court's
construction seems to be more in pace with the general policy
behind such statutes. A liquor code is to be liberally construed in the interests of public welfare and not so as to benefit an individual or to aid the licensee for his private gain.2 8
As a result of the Johnson case, as it was a furtherance of the
Bogus opinion, holders of liquor licenses will now be permitted
to mortgage their licenses in conjunction with the other property and mortgagees will receive a greater security interest
upon the premises as an entity. A liquor interest may now
be viewed in a more proper perspective as a truly valuable
28. In re Weiss' Liquor License, 187 Pa. Super. 89, 142 A.2d 385 (1958).
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asset with definite property characteristics which may be
subject to a lien.
TERRANCE L. O'CONNOR
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